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Abstract
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inflation rate. Our model suggests that an increase in the progressivity of the tax system induces a
smaller response in real output to a change in the price level. This implies that increased incometax progressivity reduces the equilibrium inflation rate and that the effect of increased income-tax
progressivity on inflation is smaller when the central bank places a higher weight on inflation or
when there is greater openness. Examination of cross-country inflation data provides empirical
support for these key predictions.
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OPENNESS, INCOME-TAX PROGRESSIVITY, AND INFLATION
1. Introduction
A significant literature has developed since Romer’s (1993) seminal paper
exploring the nature of the relationship between the extent of openness to international
trade and inflation. Romer’s motivation for the negative dependence of inflation on
openness observed in cross-country data hinged on the idea that greater openness
might worsen the terms of the output-inflation trade-off, thereby reducing a monetary
authority’s incentive to inflate. This rationale best applies to countries sizable enough to
affect international relative prices, and Lane (1997) explored how greater openness can
reduce the potential output gains from unexpected inflation in non-traded-goods sectors
with imperfectly competitive goods markets and sticky prices. Nevertheless, Temple’s
(2002) examination of the relationship between openness and sacrifice ratios across a
range of nations cast doubt on Romer’s proposed explanation of the openness-inflation
relationship. Daniels and VanHoose (2007) and Razin and Yuen (2002) offered
alternative perspectives indicating that in fact the sacrifice ratio should respond
positively to an increased degree of openness, yet inflation nevertheless should decline.
Daniels et al. (2005) and Razin and Loungani (2005) have provided empirical support
for a positive relationship between openness and the sacrifice ratio, while preserving the
predicted inverse relationship between openness and inflation found in the data by
Romer and others.
Missing from this literature to date has been consideration of the role that a
nation’s tax structure likely has on the equilibrium inflation rate. This paper considers
an open-economy framework that implies that in a more progressive tax system, the
marginal tax rate is more responsive to a given change in real income. Consequently,
an increase in real output induced by a rise in the price level raises the marginal tax rate
by a larger amount, which reduces the actual rise in output generated by a given

increase in the price level. This reduces the incentive to increase money growth in an
effort to raise the price level in an effort to boost output. Thus, money growth and
inflation are lower, ceteris paribus, when the tax system is more progressive.
Our model also indicates that the degree of central bank independence also
plays a role in influencing how the progressivity of the income-tax system and openness
affect inflation. This is true because central bank independence has its own effects on
the latter two variables, thereby conditioning the impacts of variations in income-tax
progressivity and openness.
To evaluate the predictions forthcoming from the theoretical model, we consider
cross-country data on income-tax progressivity, openness, central bank independence,
and inflation. Empirical analysis of cross-country inflation rates provides empirical
support favoring the theoretical prediction of a negative relationship between inflation
and the progressivity of the income tax system. This analysis also supports the theory’s
subsidiary implications that greater openness and increased central bank independence
both reduce the effects of income-tax progressivity on inflation.
The next section presents our theoretical model and its predictions regarding
how income-tax progressivity, openness, central bank independence affect the inflation
rate. Section 3 assesses the empirical implications of our analysis and evaluates the
evidence. Section 6 summarizes our conclusions.
2. A Model of the Interplay Among Openness, Progressive Taxation, and Inflation
The theoretical framework is based in part on the model developed in Daniels
and VanHoose (2007). There are numerous atomistic firms, indexed i, distributed
uniformly along a unit interval. A portion, , of firms have workforces that contractually
set nominal wages in advance of labor-market clearing. Spot labor markets determine
nominal wages in the portion of firms, 1-, that do not have such contracts. Duca and
VanHoose (2001) have shown in a closed-economy version of this basic framework that
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if risk-neutral firms and risk-averse workers face common aggregate shocks and
heterogeneously distributed firm-specific disturbances,  typically lies between zero
and unity but declines as the variability of firm-specific disturbances increases relative to
the volatility of aggregate shocks. To maintain tractability, we treat  as an exogenous
parameter and thereby abstract from considerations of disturbances that influence the
share of firms with nominal wage contracts.
We also consider the competitive limit of the Daniels-VanHoose framework, in
which we take into account income taxation. The output produced by a given firm i is
(1)

yi = li ,

where yi is the log of output and li is the log of employment at firm i. We abstract from
productivity or other shocks that would not influence trend inflation in the standard
Barro-Gordon (1983) discretionary-policy framework. The domestic nation’s incomeexpenditure equilibrium condition (for a derivation of this Cobb-Douglas approximation,
see, for instance, Canzoneri and Henderson, 1991, or Bryson, et. al., 1993) is given by
(2)

y = η(p* + s - p) + (1-β)y + βy*;
1

1

0

0

where y   y i di is the log of aggregate domestic output; p   pi di is the log of the
aggregate domestic price level; the average propensity to import, β, is a fraction;  is
the elasticity of desired spending with respect to the real exchange rate; p* is the log of
the aggregate foreign price level; s is the log of the domestic currency price of foreign
currency; and y* is the log of aggregate foreign output. Specifying analogous structural
relationships for a foreign nation would yield a two-country framework in which y* and p*
would be endogenous variables, but here we assume the output and prices abroad are
exogenously determined. Henceforth, the foreign money stock, foreign price level, and
foreign output are normalized at unity, so that p* and y* equal zero. Finally, domestic
income is determined by the quantity equation,
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(3)

y = m – p,

where m is the log of the money stock and where the log of velocity has been
normalized at a value of zero.
Using (1) in the profit function, PiYi – WiLi , yields the labor demand function for a
firm i (with the intercept suppressed because it plays no role in our subsequent
analysis):
(4)

l id =

- (wi - p )
,
1- 

where wi is the log of the nominal wage for the firm.
Workers can consume both domestically produced output and foreign-produced
goods. Consequently, labor supply to firms depends on the after-tax real wage
computed in terms of the overall price workers pay for a basket of both domestic and
foreign goods:
(5)

lis = [wi – (1-β)p – βs –  ],

where  > 0 and where  is the marginal tax rate applied to workers’ wage income, with
all revenues collected by the government used to fund the distribution of lump-sum
transfers to agents.
For firms with or without nominal wage contracts, the full-information, marketclearing wage satisfies (4) and (5) simultaneously and equals
^

(6)

wi =

[ (1 -  ) + 1] p +  (1 -  ) (s - p ) +  (1-  )
.
[ (1-  ) + 1]

Hence, this nominal wage rate, which is the wage actually paid by firm i if it is among
the share, 1-, of firms without nominal wage contracts, depends positively on the
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marginal income tax rate. Substitution of (6) into either (4) or (5) and the result into (1)
yields output of a noncontract firm with market-clearing (mc) wages:
(7)

y imc =

 β (s - p ) -  (1-  )
.
[ (1-  ) + 1]

Thus, output of a firm without wage contracts responds negatively to a real depreciation
of the home currency, because this reduces the purchasing power of workers’ wages
and thereby generates a ceteris paribus decline in labor supply and hence a decline in
spot-market employment at noncontract firms. Because a higher marginal tax rate
induces a decline in labor supply that requires paying a higher nominal wage, a
noncontract firm’s output also depends negatively on the marginal tax rate.
For atomistic wage setters within the fraction, , of firms with nominal wage
contracts, the contract wage is equal to the expected value of the market clearing wage:
(8)

w ic =

[ (1 -  ) + 1] pe +  (1 -  ) (s e - pe ) +  (1-  ) e
.
[ (1-  ) + 1]

Substituting (8) into (4) and the result into (1) yields output of a firm with wage contracts:
(9)

y ic =

 [ (1 -  ) + 1]( p - pe ) -  (1 -  ) (s e - p e ) -  (1-  ) e
.
(1 -  )[ (1-  ) + 1]

Thus, output increases in response to price-level prediction errors, an anticipated real
home currency appreciation, or an anticipated cut in the marginal tax rate.
To explore the implications of the structure of a nation’s tax system for the
relationship between openness, the price-responsiveness of output, and inflation, we
follow McCallum and Whitaker (1979), Benavie and Froyen (1986), and Waller and
VanHoose (1989) by considering the marginal tax rate function given by
(10)

 =  0 + 1 y ,
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where  0 is a base level of the marginal tax rate and  1 determines the degree of
progressivity of the tax system. If  1 = 0, the marginal tax rate is independent of
income, implying a proportional tax system. For  1 < 0, the tax system is regressive,
and for  1 > 0, the tax system is progressive.
Firms behave identically, so that y ic = y c for all i  [0, ], y inc = y nc for all i  (,
1]. It follows that y =  yc + (1-)ync. Together with the marginal tax rate function in
(10), equations (7) and (9) then imply a semi-reduced-form solution for ouput that can
be combined with (3) and (2) to determine the semi-reduced forms for the log of the
price level and the nominal exchange rate in terms of expected values of the various
macroeconomic variables. Substitution of these solutions back in the model then yields
a semi-reduced-form expression for aggregate output:
(11) y =

 [(1-  ) +1]m - { [(1-  ) +1]pe + (1-  )[ 0 +  (s e - pe )  1 (me - pe )]}
.
[1-  (1-  ) ][(1-  ) +1] + (1-  )(1-  )(1 +  2 )

This implies that the responsiveness of aggregate output to a change in the
 y  [ (1 -  ) + 1 ] + (1-  ) (1 -  )
=
, which is
domestic price level is given by
 p (1-  )[ (1-  ) +1] + (1-  ) (1-  )1
directly related to the magnitude of β. Consequently, as in Daniels and VanHoose
(2007), an increase in openness increases the sensitivity of output to a rise in the price
level. In addition, this price-sensitivity of output is inversely related to the  1 parameter
and hence to the degree of progressivity of the income tax system. In a more
progressive tax system, the marginal tax rate is more responsive to a given change in
real income. An increase in real output induced by a given price-level increase thereby
boosts the marginal tax rate by a larger amount under a more progressive income tax,
which in turn tends to depress to a greater extent the actual output increase that is
forthcoming from the given price-level increase. Hence, an increase in the extent of
income-tax progressivity brings about a smaller response in real output to a change in
the price level, ceteris paribus, in a nation with a more progressive tax system.
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Following Barro and Gordon (1983), we consider a Nash game involving the
central bank and wage setters in which the central bank seeks to minimize the policy
loss function,
^

(12)

L = E [(y - y )2 + bcbψ2],
^

where y is the nondistorted, full-information economy-wide output under market
clearing, bcb is the relative weight that the central bank places on the inflation
component of its loss function, and ψ is the CPI inflation rate. Re-solving the model
under full information—that is, with se = s, pe = p, and me = m ex ante—yields
- 0
to be the full-information output level, which equals zero in a
 [ (1-  ) +1+  1 +  2 ]
^

nondistorted situation in which  0 =  1 = 0. Consequently, y = 0. Under the simplifying
assumption that p-1 = s-1 = 0, the CPI inflation rate is ψ = (1-β)p + βs. Minimizing (16)
with respect to m and solving for ψ ultimately yields
 b A( -  2 ){( +1)(1-  ) +  [ (1-  ) +1]} -  2 (1-  ) [ (1-  ) +1] 
(13)  =  cb


bcb A[ (1-  ) +1][1-  (1-  )]




 (1-  )

 ,
2  0

(1
)[

(1
)
+1]
+

(1
)(

+

)
1



where A  [ (1-  ) +  2  ][ (1-  ) +1] + (1-  ) ( 1 +  2 ).

< 0 , so that an increase in the degree
An immediate implication of (13) is that
 1
of progressivity of the tax system unambiguously reduces the equilibrium inflation rate
under discretion. An increase in tax progressivity makes output less sensitive to
changes in the price level, which in turn reduces the incentive to increase money growth
in an effort to raise the price level in an effort to boost output. As a consequence,
money growth and CPI inflation are lower, ceteris paribus, when the tax system is more
progressive.
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Further evaluation of the expression for


indicates that either an increase in bcb
 1

or in a rise in  causes the absolute value of this derivative to decrease. An increase in
the relative weight placed on inflation, bcb, in the central bank’s loss function reduces
inflation, so the marginal effect on inflation of greater tax progressivity is lower at larger
values of bcb. As in Daniels and VanHoose (2006) and Daniels et al. (2005), the direct
effect of greater openness () is to increase the sensitivity of output with respect to the
price level, so an increase in  tends to counter the effect of greater tax progressivity on

inflation, thereby reducing the absolute value of
.
 1
In general, both the direct effect of greater openness and the effects of changes
in the sensitivity of inflation with respect to openness resulting from variations in the
degree of tax progressivity or the central bank’s loss weight on inflation depend on
relative magnitudes of parameter values. Evaluation of the direct effect of an increase
in the degree of openness, , on inflation yields sufficient, but unnecessary, conditions



for greater openness to reduce inflation  that is,
< 0  : (1) most of the weight in the



loss function is on the inflation objective (a sufficiently large value of bcb) or (2) the
marginal propensity to import is sufficiently larger than the sensitivity of expenditures

< 0 , then it is also true that an
with respect to the real exchange rate ( 2 > ). If

increase in either  1 or in bcb generate reductions in the absolute magnitude of this
derivative; that is, in this case, either a greater degree of progressivity of the tax system
or an increased policy weight on inflation tend to reduce the effect of increased
openness on inflation.
The reason for the potential ambiguity in the inflation effects of openness is that
greater openness exerts two conflicting effects. On one hand, as in Daniels and
VanHoose (2006) and Daniels et al. (2006), because labor supply depends on the real
wage computed in terms of the overall price that workers pay for a basket of both
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domestic and foreign goods, a real depreciation of the home currency reduces the
purchasing power of market-clearing wages, which generates a ceteris paribus fall in
labor supply that, in turn, causes a decline in spot-market employment. Thus, the
output of firms without wage contracts responds negatively to a real depreciation of the
home currency, and this effect is enhanced in a more open economy, ultimately
implying that a greater degree of openness causes output to be more responsive to
inflation. This, in turn, tends to increase the incentive for the central bank to push up
money growth and generate higher equilibrium inflation.
On the other hand, increased openness reduces the extent to which an
unanticipated real depreciation can potentially generate an increase in output. To see
this, note that (2) implies, under the maintained assumption p* = 0, that, ex ante,
aggregate expenditures are given by y =  -1(s - p). An increase in the value of the
marginal propensity to import, , relative to the sensitivity of expenditures with respect
to the real exchange rate, , thereby reduces the extent to which changes in the real
exchange rate brought about my variations in the money stock can affect aggregate
demand, ex ante. This, in turn, reduces the incentive for a discretionary central bank to
increase money growth.
On net, therefore, the ex post effect of greater openness on equilibrium inflation
is ambiguous in the present model, although as noted above, it is more likely to be
negative if  2 > . As noted above, from an ex ante perspective, a sufficiently higher
initial value of the marginal propensity to import relative to an initial value of the
expenditure responsiveness to the real exchange rate reduces the extent to which a
monetary expansion can boost output via a discretionary increase in money growth. At
the same time, because CPI inflation is  = p + (s-p), a rise in the magnitude of  also
has the effect of enlarging the extent to which the real exchange rate plays a role in
determining equilibrium CPI inflation, which increases the ex ante incentive for the
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central bank to reduce money growth. This explains why if  is sufficiently large relative
to , increased openness is more likely to reduce equilibrium inflation.
3. Empirical Implications and Evidence
Following are the empirical implications of the forgoing discussion:
i) increased income-tax progressivity reduces the equilibrium inflation rate;
ii) the effect of increased income-tax progressivity on inflation is smaller when the
central bank places a higher weight on inflation or when there is greater openness;
and
iii) the effect of greater openness on inflation is generally empirically ambiguous, but if
this effect is negative, then it is absolutely smaller due to increased income-tax
progressivity or when the central bank places a higher weight on inflation.
To measure the degree of income-tax progressivity (Tax) for individual nations,
we use the ratio of the marginal tax rate to the average tax rate. The marginal tax rate
is measured by the change in single employees’ social security contribution and
personal income tax payments in response to a change in gross wage earnings. The
average tax rate is the level of social security and tax payments divided by the level of
gross wage earnings. Both the marginal tax rate and the average tax rate are from
Source OECD.1
We use the measure of central bank independence described above along with
the inflation rate, which is based on the GDP deflator, and openness, expressed as the
ratio of imports to GDP, both derived from the IMF International Financial Statistics.
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics on the sample data.
Table 2 reports regression results for an annual sample of 17 countries covering
the period 1979-1999.2 Because of the time-series nature of this data set, all
regressions are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors and correcting for
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serial correlation using the Newey-West procedure. Column (1) of the table provides
results for the base specification that controls only for central bank independence and
openness. The coefficients for both variables are negative and statistically significant
(although the p-value for openness is 8.4 percent).
Column (2) of Table 2 reports a re-specification in which the tax progressivity
measure is added. The estimated coefficient for the Openness variable is not
statistically significant in this specification. The tax progressivity (Tax) coefficient,
however, is negative and statistically significant, consistent with the theoretical model’s
key implication that increased income-tax progressivity reduces the equilibrium inflation
rate.
The regression specification in column (3) of Table 2 adds interactions of tax
progressivity and central bank independence (Tax*CBI) and for tax progressivity and
openness (Tax*Openness). The estimated negative Openness coefficient is once again
statistically significant (with a p-value of 6.5 percent) in this broadened specification.
The interaction term between tax progressivity and central bank independence is also
statistically significant and positive, consistent with the theoretical model’s prediction
that the (negative) effect of greater income-tax progressivity on inflation is smaller with
greater central bank independence (assumed consistent with a higher central bank loss
weight on inflation). Consistent with the theoretical framework’s implication that the
(negative) effect of greater income-tax progressivity on inflation is smaller with greater
openness, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term between tax progressivity
and openness is positive (indicating a absolute smaller effect of tax progressivity), but
this coefficient is statistically insignificant.
Column (4) in Table 2 considers the impact that outliers might have on the
results. To test for outliers, we use the dfits test, Cooksd test, and the Welsch distance
test on the regression model in column (3). The results for all three tests imply outliers
in 1980 and 1982 for New Zealand, and in 1980 for the United States. These three
11

observations are deleted from the specification in column (3) to generate the results in
column (4). Controlling for these outliers has no practical impact on our results.
According to hypothesis (iii) implied by theoretical framework, if openness is
statistically significant and negative, then its effect becomes absolutely smaller as the
degree of tax progressivity increases. Consistent with this hypothesis, the estimated
coefficient on Tax*Openness is consistently positive, but it is never significant at a level
of 10 percent or less. To further explore the third hypothesis, we also added an
interaction term between central bank independence and openness in specification (4).
The only resulting changes are a positive but statistically insignificant effect of openness
on inflation and an improvement in the p-value of the Tax*CBI interaction variable, to
2.8 percent. In addition, the estimated effect of the openness-CBI interaction term is
negative and significant at the 10 percent level. Hence, there is some support for the
theoretical prediction that the impact of openness on inflation is empirically ambiguous
once the degrees of income-tax progressivity and central bank independence are taken
into account.
We also consider some recent results regarding the relationship between
openness and inflation. According to Levin and Piger (2002) and Ihrig and Marquez
(2003), time-series inflation data exhibit a break around the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Bleaney (1999) further notes that around the time of this same break, the economic and
statistical significance of the openness-inflation relationship began to diminish among
developing nations. Including a dummy variable with a value of zero up until 1989 and
a value of unity for the remainder of the sample period had little impact on our results.
The p-value for Tax*CBI increased slightly, and the p-value for Tax*Openness
decreased somewhat, moving both into the 10 to 15 percent significance range.3
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6. Conclusion
This paper has developed an open-economy framework indicating that the
structure of the tax system should worsen the terms of the output-inflation trade-off and
reduce the equilibrium inflation rate. Analysis of the inflation rates of seventeen nations
provides support for our predictions regarding direct and interactive effects of incometax progressivity, openness, and central bank independence on inflation.
The role of taxation as a factor influencing the interactions among openness,
central bank independence, and inflation rates has not received attention in the
literature. The theoretical and empirical conclusions of this paper indicate that more
consideration should be given to the role of fiscal variables as factors conditioning
equilibrium inflation rates in open economies.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Data Used to
Test Predictions Regarding Inflation

Mean
Median
St. Dev.

Annual Panel of 17 Countries, 1970-1999a
Inflation
Tax
Central Bank
Progressivity Independence
4.63
1.17
51.46
3.38
1.44
47.38
3.86
0,85
19.21

a

Openness
29.79
28.80
13.44

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States
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Table 2
Inflation Estimates
Annual Panel of 17 Countries, 1970-1999
(Absolute Values of t-Ratios Based on Newey-West Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses)

Constant
CBI
Openness

(1)
9.097***
1.062
-0.062***
0.0132
-2.904*
1.675

(2)
9.506***
1.019
-0.062***
0.013
-1.665
1.806
-0.702***
0.226

14.50
357

15.07
357

Tax
Tax*CBI
Tax*Openness
F Statistic
Observations

(3)
16.345***
2.935
-0.168***
0.057
-5.978*
3.232
-4.757***
1.636
0.064**
0.031
1.742
1.616
10.55
357

(4)a
15.071***
2.769
-0.149***
0.053
-5.418**
3.046
-4.157***
1.553
0.054*
0.029
1.640
1.523
28.42
354

* Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
a
The model in column 4 omits three outliers; 1980 and 1982 for New Zealand and 1980 for the United
States.
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Appendix
T
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FOOTNOTES
1

During the 1979-1993 interval, the OECE reports tax rates only for odd years. For this
period, missing observations on the tax rates were imputed using the average of the
two adjacent rates. All of the data used in this paper and all regression results are
available upon request.

2

The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom, and United States.

3

Overall, the effect of openness on inflation shows the greatest sensitivity to model
specification and controls for model breaks and outliers.

21

